

**BEFORE THE NEBRASKA TAX EQUALIZATION
AND REVIEW COMMISSION**

KATIE G. MEINTS,)	
)	
Appellant,)	Case No. 09SV 004
)	
v.)	DECISION AND ORDER
)	AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
GAGE COUNTY BOARD OF)	THE GAGE COUNTY BOARD OF
EQUALIZATION,)	EQUALIZATION
)	
Appellee.)	

The above-captioned case was called for a hearing on the merits of an appeal by Katie G. Meints ("the Taxpayer") to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission ("the Commission"). The hearing was held in the Commission's Hearing Room on the sixth floor of the Nebraska State Office Building in the City of Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, on July 20, 2010, pursuant to an Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued April 23, 2010. Commissioner Wickersham, Chairperson of the Commission, was the presiding hearing officer. Commissioner Warnes was absent. Commissioner Wickersham, as Chairperson, designated Commissioners Wickersham, Salmon, and Hotz as a panel of the Commission to hear the appeal. Commissioner Hotz was excused. Commissioner Salmon was present. The appeal was heard by a quorum of a panel of the Commission.

Katie G. Meints was present at the hearing. No one appeared as legal counsel for the Taxpayer.

Randall R. Ritnour, County Attorney for Gage County, Nebraska, was present as legal counsel for the Gage County Board of Equalization ("the County Board").

The Commission took statutory notice, received exhibits, and heard testimony.

The Commission is required to state its final decision and order concerning an appeal, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, on the record or in writing. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009). The final decision and order of the Commission in this case is as follows.

I. ISSUES

The Taxpayer has asserted that taxable value of the subject property as of January 1, 2009, is less than taxable value as determined by the County Board. The issues on appeal related to that assertion are:

Whether the decision of the County Board determining taxable value of the subject property is unreasonable or arbitrary; and

The taxable value of the subject property on January 1, 2009.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

The Commission finds and determines that:

1. The Taxpayer has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the above captioned appeal to maintain the appeal.
2. The parcel of real property to which this appeal pertains ("the Subject Property") is described in the table below.
3. Taxable value of the subject property placed on the assessment roll as of January 1, 2009, ("the assessment date") by the Gage County Assessor, value as proposed in a timely

protest, and taxable value as determined by the County Board is shown in the following table:

Case No. 09SV 004

Description: E½SW¼ Section 14, Township 4, Range 7, Gage County, Nebraska.

	Board Notice Value ¹	Taxpayer Protest Value	Board Determined Value
Agricultural Land	\$116,390.00	\$104,751.00	\$116,390.00
Total	\$116,390.00	\$104,751.00	\$116,390.00

An initial notice of value was given by the County Assessor. (E5:1). Notice of value was also given by the County Board. (E7:1).

4. An appeal of the County Board's decision was filed with the Commission.
5. An Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing issued on April 23, 2010, set a hearing of the appeal for July 20, 2010, at 11:00 a.m. CDST.
6. An Affidavit of Service, which appears in the records, of the Commission establishes that a copy of the Order for Hearing and Notice of Hearing was served on all parties.
7. Taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date for the tax year 2009 is:

Case No. 09SV 004

Agricultural land \$ 116,390.00

Total \$ 116,390.00.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

1. Subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission in this appeal is over all questions necessary to determine taxable value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(7) (Reissue 2009).

2. “Actual value is the most probable price expressed in terms of money that a property will bring if exposed for sale in the open market, or in an arm’s length transaction, between a willing buyer and a willing seller, both of whom are knowledgeable concerning all the uses to which the real property is adapted and for which the real property is capable of being used. In analyzing the uses and restrictions applicable to real property the analysis shall include a full description of the physical characteristics of the real property and an identification of the property rights valued.” Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).
3. Actual value may be determined using professionally accepted mass appraisal methods, including, but not limited to, the (1) sales comparison approach using the guidelines in section 77-1371, (2) income approach, and (3) cost approach. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-112 (Reissue 2009).
4. “Actual value, market value, and fair market value mean exactly the same thing.”
Omaha Country Club v. Douglas County Board of Equalization, et al., 11 Neb.App. 171, 180, 645 N.W.2d 821, 829 (2002).
5. Taxable value is the percentage of actual value subject to taxation as directed by section 77-201 of Nebraska Statutes and has the same meaning as assessed value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-131 (Reissue 2009).
6. All taxable real property, with the exception of agricultural land and horticultural land, shall be valued at actual value for purposes of taxation. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201(1) (Reissue 2009).
7. Agricultural land and horticultural land shall be valued for purposes of taxation at seventy five percent of its actual value. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201 (2) (Reissue 2009).

8. Agricultural land and horticultural land means a parcel of land which is primarily used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, including wasteland lying in or adjacent to and in common ownership or management with other agricultural land and horticultural land. Agricultural land and horticultural land does not include any land directly associated with any building or enclosed structure." Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1359 (1) (Reissue 2009).
9. "Agricultural or horticultural purposes means used for the commercial production of any plant or animal product in a raw or unprocessed state that is derived from the science and art of agriculture, aquaculture, or horticulture. Agricultural or horticultural purposes includes the following uses of land:
 - (a) Land retained or protected for future agricultural or horticultural purposes under a conservation easement as provided in the Conservation and Preservation Easements Act except when the parcel or a portion thereof is being used for purposes other than agricultural or horticultural purposes; and
 - (b) Land enrolled in a federal or state program in which payments are received for removing such land from agricultural or horticultural production shall be defined as agricultural land or horticultural land." Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1359 (2) (Reissue 2009).
10. The Legislature may enact laws to provide that the value of land actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural use shall for property tax purposes be that value which such land has for agricultural or horticultural use without regard to any value which such land might have for other purposes or uses. Neb. Const. art. VIII, §1 (5).

11. Agricultural or horticultural land which has an actual value as defined in section 77-112 reflecting purposes or uses other than agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses shall be assessed as provided in subsection (3) of section 77-201 if the land meets the qualifications of this subsection and an application for such special valuation is filed and approved pursuant to section 77-1345. In order for the land to qualify for special valuation all of the following criteria shall be met: (a) The land is located outside the corporate boundaries of any sanitary and improvement district, city, or village except as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and (b) the land is agricultural or horticultural land. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1344 (1) (Reissue 2009).
12. Agricultural land and horticultural land actively devoted to agricultural or horticultural purposes which has value for purposes other than agricultural or horticultural uses and which meets the qualifications for special valuation under section 77-1344 shall constitute a separate and distinct class of property for taxation, shall be subject to taxation, and shall be valued for taxation at seventy-five percent of its special value as defined in section 77-1343. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-201 (3) (Reissue 2009).
13. Special value is the value land would have for agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses without regard to the actual value the land would have for other purposes.. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1343 (5) (Reissue 2009).
14. The eligibility of land for the special valuation provisions is to be determined each year as of January 1. If land becomes disqualified on or before December 31 it continues to receive special valuation until January 1 of the following year. Neb. Rev. Stat. 77-1344 (3) (Reissue 2009).

15. A presumption exists that the County Board has faithfully performed its duties and has acted on competent evidence. *City of York v. York County Bd. Of Equalization*, 266 Neb. 297, 64 N.W.2d 445 (2003).
16. The presumption in favor of the county board may be classified as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987).
17. The presumption disappears if there is competent evidence to the contrary. *Id.*
18. The order, decision, determination, or action appealed from shall be affirmed unless evidence is adduced establishing that the order, decision, determination, or action was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016 (8) (Reissue 2009).
19. Proof that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary must be made by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002).
20. "Clear and convincing evidence means and is that amount of evidence which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a fact to be proved." *Castellano v. Bitkower*, 216 Neb. 806, 812, 346 N.W.2d 249, 253 (1984).
21. A decision is "arbitrary" when it is made in disregard of the facts and circumstances and without some basis which could lead a reasonable person to the same conclusion. *Phelps Cty. Bd. of Equal. v. Graf*, 258 Neb 810, 606 N.W.2d 736 (2000).

22. A decision is unreasonable only if the evidence presented leaves no room for differences of opinion among reasonable minds. *Pittman v. Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 258 Neb 390, 603 N.W.2d 447 (1999).
23. “An owner who is familiar with his property and knows its worth is permitted to testify as to its value.” *U. S. Ecology v. Boyd County Bd. Of Equalization*, 256 Neb. 7, 16, 588 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1999).
24. The County Board need not put on any evidence to support its valuation of the property at issue unless the taxpayer establishes the Board's valuation was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Bottorf v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization*, 7 Neb.App. 162, 580 N.W.2d 561 (1998).
25. A Taxpayer, who only produced evidence that was aimed at discrediting valuation methods utilized by the county assessor, failed to meet burden of proving that value of property was not fairly and proportionately equalized or that valuation placed upon property for tax purposes was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Beynon v. Board of Equalization of Lancaster County*, 213 Neb. 488, 329 N.W.2d 857 (1983).
26. A Taxpayer must introduce competent evidence of actual value of the subject property in order to successfully claim that the subject property is overvalued. Cf.

IV. ANALYSIS

The subject property is an unimproved parcel in rural Gage County. The subject property is classified as agricultural land and horticultural land for purposes of assessment. Agricultural land and horticultural land is assessed at 75% of its actual value or at 75% of its special value for

agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses without regard to the actual value the land would have for other purposes. The subject property has been qualified for special valuation in prior years. There is no evidence that the subject property was disqualified for special valuation in tax year 2009.

The County Assessor for tax year 2009 determined that 75% of actual value of agricultural land and horticultural land was equal to 75% of its special value for agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses without regard to the actual value the land would have for other purposes. *2009 Reports and Opinions of the Property Tax Administrator, Gage County, 34.* A witness for the Taxpayer related conversations with one or more persons in the County Assessor's office in which she was advised that special valuation wasn't being "used". While open to interpretation to mean that special value wasn't in effect for tax year 2009 that representation is also consistent with the position of the County Assessor as stated in the 2009 Reports and Opinions of the Property Tax Administrator. If special value for agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses without regard to the actual value the land would have for other purposes and 75% of actual value are equal, it is unnecessary to consider special value or "use" special value.

The Taxpayer points out that application of greenbelt or special value for assessment purposes in tax year 2008 was clearly reflected in assessment documentation. Exhibit 4 at page 1 shows for example that the subject property is in a greenbelt area with a date of 04/16/2002 with columns for recapture value and assessed value with assessed or greenbelt value being lower. An assessment report for tax year 2009 does not indicate that the subject property is in a greenbelt area nor is a date stated. (E6:1). Another assessment report for the tax year 2009 does show that

the subject property is in a greenbelt area and shows a date of 04/16/2002. (E10:32). The same information shown on Exhibit 4 page 1. The assessment records for tax year 2009 have columns headed Rcp Value. Recapture value was the actual value of agricultural land and horticultural land for all uses. (Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1343 (5) (Cum. Supp. 2008). The last year in which recapture value was used in the assessment process was 2008. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1344 (5). (Cum. Supp. 2008). Values under the Rcp Value column and the Assessed Value column are equal. Again although the language is not correct, Rcp Value was no longer used, if special value was equal to 75% of actual value the use of values in the column is correct to reflect that fact.

The final question is then whether there is in fact a difference between special value for agricultural or horticultural purposes or uses without regard to the actual value the land would have for other purposes as determined for the subject property and 75% of its actual value. The Taxpayer acknowledged that special value could change from year to year and proposed an increase from \$94,825, the prior years assessment, as shown on Exhibit 5 page 1 to \$104,751 as shown on Exhibit 1 page 1. The increase proposed by the Taxpayer is a 10.46% increase in assessed value. The County Assessor stated that for tax year 2009 values of irrigated land increased 18% dryland increased 17.8% and grassland increased 32.6%. *2009 Reports and Opinions of the Property Tax Administrator, Gage County*, 34. The subject property is dryland. (E5:1). There is no evidence that special value and 75% of actual value agricultural land and horticultural land are not equal in Gage County for tax year 2009. Because special value and 75% of actual value of agricultural land and horticultural land are equal in Gage County for tax

year 2009, application of special valuation would not have had an effect on assessment of the subject property.

As noted above there is no evidence that the subject property has been disqualified for use of special valuation. The evidence is that “use” of special valuation did not make a difference in its assessment. If the subject property remains qualified for special valuation and special value is determined to be less than 75% of its actual value, the subject property would again realize a benefit from the application of special valuation. Special valuation does not, however, confer a benefit in Gage County for tax year 2009.

V. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Commission has subject matter jurisdiction in this appeal.
2. The Commission has jurisdiction over the parties to this appeal.
3. The Taxpayer has not produced competent evidence that the County Board failed to faithfully perform its official duties and to act on sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions.
4. The Taxpayer has not adduced sufficient, clear and convincing evidence that the decision of the County Board is unreasonable or arbitrary and the decision of the County Board should be affirmed.

**VI.
ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The decision of the County Board determining taxable value of the subject property as of the assessment date, January 1, 2009, is affirmed.
2. Taxable value, for the tax year 2009, of the subject property is:

Case No. 09SV 004

Agricultural land \$ 116,390.00

Total \$ 116,390.00.

3. This decision, if no appeal is timely filed, shall be certified to the Gage County Treasurer, and the Gage County Assessor, pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5018 (Reissue 2009).
4. Any request for relief, by any party, which is not specifically provided for by this order is denied.
5. Each party is to bear its own costs in this proceeding.
6. This decision shall only be applicable to tax year 2009.
7. This order is effective for purposes of appeal on July 28, 2010.

Nancy J. Salmon, Commissioner

SEAL

APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE COMMISSION MUST SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEB. REV. STAT. §77-5019 (REISSUE 2009), OTHER PROVISIONS OF NEBRASKA STATUTES, AND COURT RULES.

I concur in the result.

The analysis above considers two standards of review for review. One standard of review is stated as a presumption found in case law, the other is found as stated in statute. I do not believe consideration of two standards of review are required by statute or case law.

The Commission is an administrative agency of state government. See *Creighton St. Joseph Regional Hospital v. Nebraska Tax Equalization and Review Commission*, 260 Neb. 905, 620 N.W.2d 90 (2000). As an administrative agency of state government the Commission has only the powers and authority granted to it by statute. *Id.* The Commission is authorized by statute to review appeals from decisions of a county board of equalization, the Tax Commissioner, and the Department of Motor Vehicles. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). In general, the Commission may only grant relief on appeal if it is shown that the order, decision, determination, or action appealed from was unreasonable or arbitrary. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5016(8) (Cum. Supp. 2008).

The Commission is authorized to review decision of a county board of equalization determining taxable values. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-5007 (Supp. 2007). Review of county board of equalization decisions is not new in Nebraska law. As early as 1903 Nebraska Statutes provided for review of County Board assessment decisions by the district courts. Laws 1903, c. 73 §124. The statute providing for review did not state a standard for that review. *Id.* A standard of review stated as a presumption was adopted by Nebraska's Supreme Court. See *State v. Savage*, 65 Neb. 714, 91 N.W. 716 (1902) (citing *Dixon Co. v. Halstead*, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N.W. 621 (1888) and *State v. County Board of Dodge Co.* 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887). The presumption was that the County Board had faithfully performed its official duties and had acted

upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. See *id.* In 1959, the legislature provided a statutory standard for review by the district courts of county board of equalization, assessment decisions. 1959 Neb Laws, LB 55, §3. The statutory standard of review required the District Court to affirm the decision of the county board of equalization unless the decision was arbitrary or unreasonable or the value as established was too low. *Id.* The statutory standard of review was codified in section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. §77-1511 (Cum. Supp. 1959). After adoption of the statutory standard of review Nebraska Courts have held that the provisions of section 77-5011 of the Nebraska Statutes created a presumption that the County Board has faithfully performed its official duties and has acted upon sufficient competent evidence to justify its actions. See, e.g., *Ideal Basic Indus. V. Nuckolls Cty. Bd. Of Equal.*, 231 Neb. 653, 437 N.W.2d 501 (1989). The presumption stated by the Court was the presumption that had been found before the statute was enacted.

Many appeals of decisions made pursuant to section 77-1511 were decided without reference to the statutory standard of review applicable to the district courts review of a county board of equalization's decision. See, e.g., *Grainger Brothers Company v. County Board of Equalization of the County of Lancaster*, 180 Neb. 571, 144 N.W.2d 161 (1966). In *Hastings Building Co., v. Board of Equalization of Adams County*, 190 Neb. 63, 206 N.W.2d 338 (1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court acknowledged that two standards of review existed for reviews by the district court; one statutory requiring a finding that the decision reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary, and another judicial requiring a finding that a presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully performed its official duties and acted upon sufficient competent evidence

was overcome. No attempt was made by the *Hastings* Court to reconcile the two standards of review that were applicable to the District Courts.

The Tax Equalization and Review Commission was created in 1995. 1995 Neb. Laws, LB 490 §153. Section 77-1511 of the Nebraska Statutes was made applicable to review of county board of equalization assessment decisions by the Commission. *Id.* In 2001 section 77-1511 of Nebraska Statutes was repealed. 2001 Neb. Laws, LB 465, §12. After repeal of section 77-1511 the standard for review to be applied by the Commission in most appeals was stated in section 77-5016 of the Nebraska Statutes. Section 77-5016(8) requires a finding that the decision being reviewed was unreasonable or arbitrary. *Brenner v. Banner County Board of Equalization*, 276 Neb. 275, 753 N.W.2d 802 (2008). The Supreme Court has stated that the presumption which arose from section 77-1511 is applicable to the decisions of the Commission. *Garvey Elevators, Inc. V. Adams County Bd. of Equalization*, 261 Neb. 130, 621 N.W.2d 518 (2001).

The possible results from application of the presumption as a standard of review and the statutory standard of review are: (1) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (2) the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is not overcome; (3) the presumption is not overcome and the statutory standard is overcome; (4) and finally the presumption is overcome and the statutory standard is overcome. The first possibility does not allow a grant of relief, neither standard of review has been met. The second possibility does not therefore allow a grant of relief even though the presumption is overcome because the statutory standard remains. See *City of York v. York County Bd of Equal.*, 266 Neb. 297, 664 N.W.2d 445 (2003). The third possibility requires analysis. The presumption and the statutory standard of review are different legal standards, and the statutory standard remains after the presumption has

been overcome. See *id.* The burden of proof to overcome the presumption is competent evidence. *Id.* Clear and convincing evidence is required to show that a county board of equalization's decision was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g., *Omaha Country Club v. Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal.*, 11 Neb.App. 171, 645 N.W.2d 821 (2002). Competent evidence that the county board of equalization failed to perform its duties or act upon sufficient competent evidence is not always evidence that the county board of equalization acted unreasonably or arbitrarily because the statutory standard of review remains even if the presumption is overcome. *City of York*, *supra*. Clear and convincing evidence that a county board of equalization's determination, action, order, or decision was unreasonable or arbitrary, as those terms have been defined, may however overcome the presumption that the county board of equalization faithfully discharged its duties and acted on sufficient competent evidence. In any event the statutory standard has been met and relief may be granted. Both standards of review are met in the fourth possibility and relief may be granted.

Use of the presumption as a standard of review has been criticized. See G. Michael Fenner, *About Presumptions in Civil Cases*, 17 Creighton L. Rev. 307 (1984). In the view of that author, the presumption should be returned to its roots as a burden of proof. *Id.* Nebraska's Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty of using two standards of review and classified the presumption in favor of the county board of equalization as a principle of procedure involving the burden of proof, namely, a taxpayer has the burden to prove that action by a board of equalization fixing or determining valuation of real estate for tax purposes is unauthorized by or contrary to constitutional or statutory provisions governing taxation. See *Gordman Properties Company v. Board of Equalization of Hall County*, 225 Neb. 169, 403 N.W.2d 366 (1987). Use

of the *Gordman* analysis allows consideration of both the presumption and the statutory standard of review without the difficulties inherent in the application of two standards of review. It is within that framework that I have analyzed the evidence.

Wm. R. Wickersham, Commissioner